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Howdoes the brain encode courage in a real-life fear-
ful situation that demands an immediate response?
In this study, volunteers who fear snakes had to bring
a live snake into close proximity with their heads
while their brains were scanned using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Bringing the
snake closer was associated with a dissociation
between subjective fear and somatic arousal.
Activity in the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex
(sgACC) and the right temporal pole was positively
correlated with such action. Further, activity in the
sgACC was positively correlated with the level of
fear upon choosing to overcome fear but not upon
succumbing to it. Conversely, activity in a set of inter-
related temporal lobe structures, including the amyg-
dala, was attenuated as the level of fear increased
when choosing to overcome fear. We propose how
the internally reinforced fast representational shift,
in which the courageous-response representation
gains control over behavior, takes place.
INTRODUCTION
The Roman philosopher Seneca considered all humans slaves to
fear (Seneca, 1969). Yet given the right circumstances, ordinary
people can set themselves free of this bondage and act coura-
geously. How is this achieved? To act courageously may mean
in ordinary discourse anything from rescuing a child from turbu-
lent waters to selecting a risky academic career. Such a broad
spectrum of behaviors hence spans different situations and
time intervals. However, the wide spectrum of courageous
behaviors does have a common denominator, which is the
performance of voluntary action opposed to that promoted by
ongoing fear (Rachman, 1984, 1990, 2004a). This suggests
that rather different manifestations of courage might share
some core brain mechanisms. It is noteworthy that courage as
here conceived focuses on action (in spite of fearfulness) that
is observed in the general population rather than on an excep-
tional trait (fearlessness). Thus, by gauging properly definedactions of either overcoming fear or succumbing to it in an acute
controllable fearful situation, one can render certain neural
substrates of courage amenable to investigation in a brain
research laboratory setting.
Because it has to do with action to overcome fear, the study of
brain mechanisms of courage is expected to overlap with the
prolific research on brain mechanisms of fear (LeDoux, 1996),
fear extinction (Quirk et al., 2006), and cognitive control of
emotion (Ochsner andGross, 2005). There are, however, notable
differences. Experimental extinction deals with gradual recondi-
tioning to appreciate that a conditioned fear response is not
warranted any more because the original source of fear has van-
ished, whereas courageous action as considered here involves
prompt voluntary overcoming of the fear reaction to an acute,
on-line source of fear. And although courage clearly involves
emotion control, in research protocols of cognitive control of
emotion, participants are commonly instructed to use specific
cognitive strategies to regulate emotion, while success or failure
of this regulation is not instrumental in generating a behavioral
outcome, nor does it affect the unfolding of the experimental
protocol. In contrast, real-life courage involves uninstructed
idiosyncratic regulation strategies leading to behavioral out-
comes that in turn influence future decisions and actions. To
the best of our knowledge, to date, no functional brain imaging
studies have been reported that allow a choice between suc-
cumbing to a naturalistic source of fear or overcoming it and
acting on the choice; hence, there are none that have probed
brain mechanisms of swift decision and action to overcome
ongoing fear.
In this study we devised a paradigm that enables induction of
a sustained acute ecological fear ambience within a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner, while allowing
participants instant choices between overcoming and succumb-
ing to the ongoing fear and a behavioral expression of these
choices. We selected a snake as the fear-eliciting stimulus
because fear of snakes, often intense, is common in the general
population (Agras et al., 1969). Specifically, a live snake (corn
snake, Elaphe guttata, 1.5 m long) or a toy bear (a control
stimulus intended to evoke no fear) were secured to the top of
a trolley that could travel step-wise on a conveyer belt spanning
the distance between the far end of the scan room and close
proximity to the participant’s head within the scanner. Partici-
pants were instructed that their task was to reach maximal prox-
imity to the objects, while overcoming to the best of their abilityNeuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 949
Figure 1. The Experimental Setup and
Protocol
(A) The participants’ task was to reach maximal
proximity to either a live snake (Snake) or a toy
bear (ToyBear), by repeatedly choosingwhether to
bring the object closer (Advance) or move it away
(Retreat), while undergoing fMRI brain scanning.
(B) Each trial began with a black screen occluding
the participant’s view (Black screen), after which it
was lowered (Expose Object) to allow full view of
the object on the trolley. Following removal of the
screen a brief delay was enforced (Delay), after
which the word ‘‘Choose’’ was sounded via
earphones. The participant then expressed the
choice (Advance or Retreat) by pressing one of
two response device buttons (Choice). The time
between beginning of exposure of the object and
the choice button press was defined as the choice
event of interest (denoted in red). Following the
choice the black screen was raised (Conceal
Object) to again occlude the participant’s view
(Black screen). Next, the black screenwas lowered
so as to expose only a Visual Analog Scale (VAS)
display (Expose VAS) and the participant heard
the word ‘‘Rate.’’ The participant then indicated
the fear level felt during the last choice by
using the response device (Rating), after which
the VAS curser changed color (VAS feedback)
to indicate that the rating had been recorded.
The black screen was then again raised (Conceal
VAS) to completely block the participant’s view,
after which occured the concealed movement of
the trolley according to the last choice. If no choice
was made within the set time limit, the trolley
retreated. The trials were repeated until the trolley
reachedmaximal proximity to the participant or until aminimumof 20Advance and 20Retreat (or no choice) selectionsweremade. (For further details see Supple-
mental Information.)
(C) Illustrative behavior of aFearful (FF) participant, depicting thepositionof theobject (Snake,ToyBear) relative to theparticipant (starting from0,mostdistant from
the participant, to 25 (maximum) or less, nearest to the participant), at all consecutive choices made by the participant. Thus, each decent of the line in the graph
signifies a retreat choice and each ascent an approach choice. The first 15 choices in the Snake condition made by this participant were Advance after which
Retreat and Advance choices were made intermittently.
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Brain Mechanisms of Couragethe fear they might experience. In each trial, the participants
were prompted to choose whether to move the object one
step closer (Advance) or further away (Retreat) by pressing
a response button while their brains were scanned using fMRI
(Figure 1). During scanning, the subjective fear rating and skin
conductance response (SCR) for each decision were recorded
as well. The participants were also evaluated for trait anxiety in
general and for state anxiety in the experiment. Two groups of
volunteers took part in the study, selected to permit multiple
intra- and intergroup analyses of behavioral performance, phys-
iological reaction, and brain activity: Fearful, composed of
healthy individuals who fear snakes and who were selected by
using a validated snake anxiety questionnaire (SNAQ, Klorman
et al., 1974), and Fearless, composed of individuals accustomed
to handling snakes. In the following, we describe behavioral,
physiological, and brain correlates of the task. By combining
our findings with current models of fear regulation, we propose
a model of brain mechanisms that could account for what we
observe when individuals are engaged in moments of real-life
courage.950 Neuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.RESULTS
Behavior and Physiology
Self-Reported Fear, Anxiety, and Somatic Response
Weselected self-reported fear ratings as ameasure of subjective
fear because no other measure is considered to provide a direct
correlate of subjective emotional experience (Wager et al., 2008).
Furthermore, self-reported fear ratings and state anxiety scores
for the snake condition, acquired independently, were highly
correlated (r = 0.84, p < 1012), supporting the reliability of these
subjective emotion measures in our study. Fear ratings for the
snake (Snake) were significantly higher than for the toy bear
(Toy Bear) in the Fearful group (FF), but not in the Fearless group
(FL) (Figure 2A; FF: Snake (mean ± SEM) = 58.14 ± 3.84; Toy
Bear = 0.65 ± 0.25; p < 0.0005, FL: Snake = 0.21 ± 0.12; Toy
Bear = 0.21 ± 0.11; p > 0.05, interaction effect: F1, 45 = 115.04,
p < 1014). State-anxiety scores (STAI-S; Spielberger, 1983) for
the two experimental conditions exhibited a similar pattern
(Figure 2B; FF: Snake = 50.81 ± 2.23; Toy Bear = 30.29 ± 1.25;
p < 0.0005, FL: Snake = 24.75 ± 1.13; Toy Bear = 23.94 ± 0.92;
Figure 2. Fear and Anxiety Evoked by the
Experimental Stimuli
(A–C) Mean of self-reported fear ratings (A), state
anxiety (B), and choice-related skin conductance
responses (SCRs) (C) of the Fearful (FF) and Fear-
less (FL) groups for Snake and Toy Bear.
(D) Comparison of mean fear ratings for Snake in
the two FF subgroups (Fearful Retreaters, FR,
and Fearful Nonretreaters, FNR).
(E and F) Mean fear ratings (E) and choice-related
SCRs (F) of the FR group for Advance and Retreat
choices in the Snake condition. Error bars here
and below represent SEM. *p < 0.05, **p <
0.0005, ***p < 0.000005.
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Brain Mechanisms of Couragep > 0.05, interaction effect: F1, 45 = 33.97, p < 0.000005). The two
groups, however, did not significantly differ in trait anxiety
(STAI-T; Spielberger, 1983) (Figure 2B, inset; FF = 37.58 ± 1.41;
FL = 35.38 ± 1.63; p > 0.05). Choice-related SCR levels were
consistent with the subjective fear ratings and were significantly
higher for Snake than for Toy Bear in the FF, but not the FL (Fig-
ure 2C; FF: Snake = 0.74 ± 0.12 micro siemens [mS]; Toy Bear =
0.14 ± 0.05 mS; p < 0.0005, FL: Snake = 0.38 ± 0.11 mS; Toy
Bear = 0.19 ± 0.06 mS; p > 0.05, interaction effect: F1, 44 =
6.73, p < 0.05). Additionally, both fear ratings and state-anxiety
scores for Snakewere significantly higher in the FF as compared
with those in the FL (Figures 2A and 2B; p < 0.0005 for both
comparisons). SCRs displayed a similar trend (Figure 2C;
p = 0.059).
Fearful Retreaters and Nonretreaters
Examination of choice (Advance/Retreat) patterns revealed that
all the FL participants made only Advance choices in both the
Snake and Toy Bear conditions. Similar behavior was observed
in the FF in the Toy Bear condition. However, in the Snake con-
dition, the FF group appeared to consist of two subgroups:
participants who made no or a few (up to three) Retreat choices;
and those that made a substantial number (seven or above) of
Retreat choices. We dub these two subgroups ‘‘Fearful Nonre-
treaters’’ (FNR) and ‘‘Fearful Retreaters’’ (FR), respectively.
To examine whether the different behaviors of these two FF
subgroups were a result of the FNR displaying more courage
(i.e., overcoming similar levels of fear more successfully) or of
experiencing less fear as compared with the FR, we compared
the fear ratings of the two groups (Figure 2D). Significantly lower
fear ratings in the FNR as compared with those of the FR
revealed that the second was the case (FR = 75.68 ± 2.68;
FNR = 39.42 ± 3.44; p < 0.000005). We then compared the
fear ratings and SCRs for Advance and Retreat choices withinNeuron 66, 949–9the FR (Figures 2E and 2F). Both fear
ratings and SCRs for Retreat choices
were significantly higher than those for
Advance choices, suggesting that within
this group exceeding a certain threshold
of fear was correlated with a decision to
choose Retreat (fear ratings: Advance =
70.13 ± 3.13; Retreat = 88.51 ±
2.32, t15 = 7.4, p < 0.000005; SCRs:Advance = 0.56 ± 0.13 mS; Retreat = 0.88 ± 0.2 mS, t15 = 3.26,
p < 0.006).
Relationship of Self-Reported Fear to Proximity
of the Snake
A significant correlation between proximity of the object and
self-reported fear ratings was found only for the Snake condition
in the FF (mean r = 0.86 ± 0.03). In a postexperiment debriefing
questionnaire (see Supplemental Information, available online),
the score for the question ‘‘Did you need to make a larger
effort to overcome your fear as your proximity to the snake
increased?’’ in the FF was 3.96 ± 0.15 on a scale of 1–5, indi-
cating that higher fear levels necessitated a larger degree of
‘‘mental effort’’ in order to overcome fear and execute Advance
choices. The average score for the question ‘‘To what extent
did you try to overcome your fear?’’ was 3.81 ± 0.16, indicating
that such an effort was indeed made. No parallel measures
were obtained for the FL because they reported feeling no fear
in the experiment. Collectively, the above results indicate that
the Snake condition in the FF alone involved ongoing fear that
increased with proximity to the snake, necessitated increased
effort in order to overcome fear and execute Advance choices,
and, within the FR, led to Retreat choices when this effort was
unsuccessful.
Brain Correlates
Advance versus Retreat Contrasts
We proceeded to identify brain areas whose activity correlated
with overcoming fear by contrasting the blood-oxygen-level-
dependent (BOLD) response of Advance and Retreat. Since
there was no Retreat in the FL and FNR in both the Snake and
Toy Bear conditions, or in the FF in the Toy Bear condition, this
contrast was only possible in the Snake data of the FR. The
Retreat > Advance contrast yielded a network of regions,62, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 951
Figure 3. Brain Activity Differentiating Advance
from Retreat Choices
(A and B) Statistical maps (radiological orientation,
top panels) and average percent BOLD signal change
(PSC, bottom panels) for the Retreat > Advance (A) and
Advance > Retreat (B) contrasts for Snake choices of the
FR group. Maps (obtained with a threshold of p < 0.001,
corrected at a = 0.05 for cluster-level false-positive rate,
minimal cluster size >270 mm3) are overlaid on axial
(A and B) and sagittal (B) slices of the group-averaged
anatomical map of all FR subjects (z/x coordinates are
indicated on each image). For the Retreat > Advance
contrast (A), the PSC of two representative areas (right
dorsal ACC and right insula) is shown. All other ROIs
derived from this contrast exhibited a similar PSC pattern.
In all PSC graphs the heavy dotted line represents the
average time of the subjects’ choice button press (for
the FR the same line signifies both Advance and Retreat
choices because average duration of these choices was
very similar; see text). Time 0 (right light dotted line) indi-
cates the beginning of the choice event of interest as
defined by us a priori. Time 6 (left light dotted line)
indicates the average beginning of the prechoice black
screen period (for the protocol, see Figure 1B).
(C) PSC in the sgACC (left panel) and rTP (right panel) ROIs
of the FNR and FL groups inAdvance choices of the Snake
condition. Black and gray heavy dotted lines represent
the choice button presses of the FL and FNR groups,
respectively.
See also Figure S1.
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Brain Mechanisms of Courageincluding visual processing areas, motor-related areas, left infe-
rior frontal gyrus, bilateral dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
bilateral anterior insula, bilateral red nucleus, and cerebellum
(Figure 3A, top panel; Table 1). In contrast, theAdvance >Retreat
contrast yielded two regions only: the subgenual ACC (sgACC)
and the right temporal pole (rTP) (Figure 3B, top panel and
Table 1).
The differential activity between Advance and Retreatwas not
a consequence of the differences in the duration of choices of
each type (Advance = 7712 ± 446 ms; Retreat = 7534 ± 464 ms;
t15 = 0.57, p > 0.05). Due to the nature of the experimental para-
digm, however, the average number of Advance choices per
participant was significantly larger than that of Retreat choices
(Advance = 35.94 ± 1.02, Retreat = 16.63 ± 1.24; t15 = 13.87,
p < 109). To control for this difference, we conducted952 Neuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.0
n
R
R
ta
A
S
a
th
E
in
In
s
(e
ean additional analysis in which for each partici-
pant only a number of Advance choices equal
to the number of Retreat choices of the partici-
pant was used. We further utilized this analysis
to examine whether subjective fear could per
se differentiate between Advance and Retreat.
For that purpose, for each participant, the
Advance choices used when equating the
numbers of Advance and Retreat choices were
those with the highest fear ratings. Comparison
of the average fear of the Advance and Retreat
choices used in this control analysis revealed
no significant difference (Advance = 87.49 ±
2.42; Retreat = 88.25 ± 2.33; t15 = 0.84, p >.05), indicating that high levels of subjective fear alone were
ot sufficient to induce Retreat choices. An Advance versus
etreat contrast using the equated number of Advance and
etreat choices yielded statistical maps similar to those ob-
ined when using all Advance choices for both the Retreat >
dvance and Advance > Retreat contrasts (Figures S1A and
1B available online). Thus, the different activity in Advance
nd Retreat observed in the original contrast did not stem from
e larger number of Advance choices.
vent-Locked Kinetics of the Differential BOLD Signal
sgACC and rTP
both Advance and Retreat, the BOLD signal in sgACC and rTP
tarted to rise approximately 6 s before exposure to the snake
xposure which was originally defined as the onset of the choice
vent; see Figure 1B) (Figure 3B, middle panel). This time
Table 1. Regions Showing Differences between Advance and Retreat in the FR
Region x y z mm3 t value p value
Retreat > Advance L fusiform gyrus (BA 19)a 30 76 14 2377 7.67 0.000001
L lingual gyrus (BA 19) 24 64 2 256 5.04 0.0001
R precuneous (BA 7) 15 76 40 9145 6.90 0.00005
L precuneous (BA 7)b 24 79 25 8637 9.93 <106
R inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) 36 43 43 6080 7.96 0.000001
L inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) 27 46 43 2461 6.58 0.000009
R post central gyrus (BA 3) 57 25 28 2222 6.00 0.00002
R inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37)c 45 55 8 3816 6.13 0.00002
L inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37) 51 70 1 2805 7.33 0.000002
L inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37) 48 61 17 337 5.56 0.00005
L superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) 57 40 19 298 5.38 0.00008
L inferior frontal gyrus (BA 9) 45 2 19 392 6.37 0.00001
L pre central gyrus (BA 6) 33 2 28 608 8.82 <106
R middle frontal gyrus (BA 6) 24 1 55 789 6.22 0.00002
L middle frontal gyrus (BA 6) 27 7 49 867 7.12 0.000004
R dorsal ACC (BA 32) 6 5 37 4621 6.22 0.00002
L dorsal ACC (BA 32) 9 5 49 5571 7.13 0.000004
R insula (BA 13) 30 20 10 3163 8.51 <106
L insula (BA 13) 33 14 7 2721 6.94 0.000005
R red nucleusd 6 22 8 1937 7.55 0.000002
L red nucleuse 9 13 8 1244 6.03 0.00002
L cerebellar inf semi lunar lobule 9 64 42 944 7.87 0.000001
L cerebellar tonsil 27 52 32 434 6.08 0.00002
L cerebellar tonsil 30 34 38 397 5.53 0.00006
Advance > Retreat subgenual ACC (BA 32, 24, 25) 3 26 5 2351 5.94 0.00003
R temporal pole (BA 38) 33 11 26 1541 6.68 0.000007
Coordinates in Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) and associated t scores for the peak voxel in ROIs that display differential BOLD activity
betweenAdvance andRetreat. Size of thewhole ROI is indicated. The ROIs were obtainedwith a threshold of t <4.07, p < 0.001, corrected at a = 0.05
for cluster-level false-positive rate (minimal cluster size >270 mm3).
a Extending into left lingual gyrus (BA18).
b Extending into BA18.
c Extending into right middle temporal gyrus (BA 37).
d Extending into right pulvinar nucleus.
e Extending into left pulvinar nucleus.
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Brain Mechanisms of Couragecoincides with the average beginning of the prechoice black
screen rest period (see Figure 1B). In contrast, activity in the
regions of interest (ROIs) derived from the Retreat > Advance
contrast followed the exposure to the snake in both Advance
and Retreat (Figure 3A, bottom panel). This suggests that the
sgACC and rTP were engaged in some form of choice-related
activity similarly for both Advance and Retreat as early as the
rest period prior to the choice. Nevertheless, a divergence of
the Advance- and Retreat-related activations began around the
exposure to the snake. At that point in time, in Advance the
activity continued to rise and maintained a high level until the
choice button press, while in Retreat it rapidly declined. We
hypothesized that if the aforementioned Advance associated
pattern of activity in the sgACC and rTP of the FR was indeed
related to overcoming fear, it should also be observed in these
ROIs in Snake Advance choices of the FNR. This is because
these choices necessitated overcoming fear as well. Concomi-tantly, it should be observed neither in Snake Advance choices
of the FL nor in Toy Bear Advance choices of all groups, because
these did not involve overcoming fear.
In linewith this hypothesis,SnakeAdvance choices of the FNR,
but not the FL, were correlated with the aforementioned pattern
of activity in the sgACCand rTPROIs (Figure 3C). No such activity
was observed in these ROIs in Toy Bear Advance choices in any
of the groups (Figure S1C). Notably, a rise in activity in the rTP
following the choices button press was observed in all groups
in both conditions (Figures 3B, 3C, and S1C), suggesting that
this region may also be involved in postchoice processing for
all types of choices. The finding that activity in the sgACC and
rTP started to rise prior to the a priori defined choice event of
interest prompted us to evaluate a second general linear model
(GLM) in which the choice event of interest was modeled as the
time between beginning of the prechoice rest and the choice
button press (see Figure 1B). This was done in an attempt toNeuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 953
Figure 4. Brain Activity Correlated with Subjective Advance-Related Fear
(A) Statistical maps of the conjunction between [Advance > Retreat] and [PFA > Baseline] (light green) overlaid on the sgACC ROI (x, z, and y coordinates are
indicated) derived from the original Advance > Retreat contrast shown in Figure 3B. A cluster of BOLD activity was found only within this ROI. Conjunction
maps were obtained with a threshold of t > 2.4, p < 0.03.
(B) Statistical maps (radiological orientation) for the [PFA > Baseline] contrast in Snake choices of the FR group. Maps (obtained with a threshold of t < 2.95,
t > 2.95, p < 0.01, corrected at a = 0.05 for cluster-level false-positive rate, minimal cluster size >270 mm3) are overlaid on axial slices of the group-averaged
anatomical map of all FR subjects (z coordinates are indicated on each image). Encircled is activity in the sgACC ROI.
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Brain Mechanisms of Couragesearch for additional choice-related regions displaying prechoice
activity that might have been missed using the original GLM. No
such regions were identified, and the original Advance > Retreat
ROIs were replicated (Figure S1D).
Parametric Analysis of Fear-in-Advance
Higher activity in the sgACC and rTP inAdvance >Retreat did not
simply reflect higher levels of subjective fear, as evident from the
finding that average fear ratings accompanying Retreat were
higher than those accompanying Advance (see above). We
reasoned that if, however, activity in these areas reflected the
mental effort necessary to overcome fear, the level of this activity
may positively correlate with the level of fear within Advance.
This is because Advance choices involving greater fear also
necessitated a larger effort to overcome the fear (see above).
To examine this hypothesis we added an additional predictor
(‘‘Parametric Fear-in-Advance,’’ PFA) to the GLM, enabling
detection of voxels in which activity was correlated with the
level of reported fear experienced in Advance (for further details
see Experimental Procedures). A conjunction analysis of the
[Advance > Retreat] and [PFA > Baseline] contrasts (Baseline
defined as activity in the black screen periods, Figure 1B),
yielded a cluster within the sgACC ROI (Figure 4A, Table 2).
This is in line with the hypothesis that activity in the sgACC
was correlated with the mental effort exerted by participants
in successful attempts to overcome fear. Fear levels in Retreat
were consistently high and within a narrow range, thus excluding
the possibility of a parallel analysis for Retreat choices.
Apart from the sgACC, which was the only region displaying
activity positively correlated with both Advance > Retreat and
PFA, a number of additional regions exhibited PFA-correlated
activity (Figure 4B, Table 2). Positively correlated activity (i.e.,
greater activity with rising fear levels in Advance) was observed954 Neuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.in occipital areas, right supplementary motor area, right precu-
neus, right inferior parietal lobule, right middle frontal gyrus,
and left cerebellum. Negatively correlated activity (i.e., lesser
activity with rising fear levels in Advance) was observed in bilat-
eral superior temporal sulcus (STS, extending on both sides to
adjacent medial temporal gyrus (MTG) and on the right also to
adjacent insula), right parahippocampal gyrus (rPHG), right infe-
rior temporal gyrus (rITG) and, notably, bilateral amygdala.
Unique Correlation of sgACC Activity with Fear
and Action
To directly compare the activity in low- and high-fear-associated
Advance choices and in Retreat choices in the abovementioned
regions, we utilized the GLM used when controlling for the
number of Advance and Retreat choices (see above and Exper-
imental Procedures). This enabled extraction of a separate
activity measure for Low-Fear Advance (LFA) choices (mean
fear rating = 54.94 ± 4.46, n = 20.4 ± 0.9), High-Fear Advance
choices (HFA) (mean fear rating = 87.49 ± 2.42, n = 16.63 ±
1.24), and Retreat choices (mean fear rating = 88.25 ± 2.42,
n = 16.63 ± 1.24) in the different ROIs. The analysis revealed
that, with the exclusion of the sgACC, in all regions in which
we observed activity that positively correlated with PFA, the
correlation was with subjective fear per se (or alternatively
with proximity to the object or chronology in the experiment,
with which changes in subjective fear within the FR were
concomitant; see Figures S2A–S2C), regardless of the behav-
ioral outcome (Advance or Retreat). I.e., high activations were
observed for both HFA and Retreat, in which fear levels were
highest (Figure 5A). Thus, the only region displaying activity posi-
tively correlated with fear levels exclusively in Advance choices
was the sgACC. Within this region activity was greater in HFA
than in LFA and dropped considerably in Retreat (Figure 5A).
Table 2. Regions Displaying Parametric Fear-in-Advance-Correlated Activity in the FR
Region x y z mm3 t value p value
Positively correlated activity L lingual gyrus (BA 18)a 15 73 8 17025 6.19 0.00002
R middle occipital gyrus (BA 18) 24 97 7 609 4.34 0.0006
R precuneous (BA 7) 12 70 49 567 3.79 0.002
R inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) 54 40 43 280 3.58 0.003
R superior frontal gyrus (BA 6) 24 4 64 321 3.90 0.001
subgenual ACC (BA 24) 9 26 2 570 4.49 0.0004
R middle frontal gyrus (BA 9)b 21 38 19 1246 4.48 0.0004
L cerebellar tonsil 36 49 38 1482 4.32 0.0006
Negatively correlated activity R superior temporal sulcus (BA 22) 60 40 10 5363 4.90 0.0002
L superior temporal sulcus (BA 22) 60 46 10 3020 4.34 0.0006
R middle temporal gyrus (BA 19) 39 64 13 316 3.43 0.004
L middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) 57 7 11 485 4.22 0.0007
R insula (BA 13) 39 16 7 572 5.13 0.0001
R inferior temporal gyrus (BA 20) 36 34 20 1723 4.47 0.0004
R parahippocampal gyrus (BA 36) 21 37 14 327 3.38 0.004
R amygdala 15 4 11 839 4.38 0.0005
L amygdala 15 7 8 1190 4.32 0.0006
Coordinates in Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) and associated t scores for the peak voxel in ROIs that displayed Parametric-Advance-
correlated activity. Size of the whole ROI is indicated. The ROIs were obtained with a threshold of t <2.95, t > 2.95, p < 0.01, corrected at a = 0.05 for
cluster-level false-positive rate (minimal cluster size >270 mm3).
a Extending into right lingual gyrus (BA18).
b Extending into BA10.
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Brain Mechanisms of CourageIn contrast, in all regions in which we observed activity nega-
tively correlated withPFA, the negative correlation was exclusive
to Advance choices; i.e., in these regions activity in Retreat
was greater than that in HFA (Figure 5B). Thus, these regions
exhibited diminishing activity with rising subjective fear levels
(and concomitantly, with a growing effort to overcome fear)
when the effort to overcome fear was successful, and a relative
rise in activity upon its failure, an opposite pattern to that
observed in the sgACC. For a parallel analysis of the sgACC
ROI activity in Snake Advance choices of the FNR, we used
two predictors to model LFA choices (mean fear rating = 19.67 ±
2.70, n = 14.27 ± 1.13) and HFA choices (mean fear rating =
62.33 ± 3.59, n = 12.00 ± 1.16) in this group. The analysis
revealed a similar trend of rise in activity in the sgACC of the
FNR in HFA as compared to LFA choices (inset in Figure 5A,
top panel; t13 = 1.66, p = 0.058). No such rise in sgACC activity
was observed when either comparing late versus early Snake
Advance choices of the FL group or late versus early Toy Bear
Advance choices of all groups (Figures S2D–S2G). Together,
these results demonstrate that a rise in sgACC activity was
observed only in correlation with rising fear levels in Advance
choices, in line with a role for the sgACC in successful efforts
to overcome fear.
Dissociation of Self-Reported Fear and Somatic Arousal
and Its Brain Correlates
Our finding that the transition between Advance and Retreat
choices could not be explained by a rise in subjective fear levels
alone (see above) prompted us to examine the SCR level in the
different choice bins of the FR. This analysis revealed that oppo-site to the pattern of sgACC activity, and mirroring the pattern of
activity in the ROIs displaying activity negatively correlated with
subjective fear levels within Advance choices, SCR levels were
lower in HFA than in LFA choices and exhibited an increase in
Retreat over HFA choices (Figure 6A). To further characterize
the relation between the changes in sgACC activity and in
SCRs in the transition between the different states, we plotted
the changes in these measures against each other for all partic-
ipants ([HFA b – LFA b] versus [HFASCR – LFASCR] and [Retreat
b – HFA b] versus [Retreat SCR – HFA SCR]; Figure 6B). This
revealed that the transition between LFA and HFA was consis-
tently accompanied by a rise in sgACC activity and a drop in
SCR. Conversely, the transition between HFA and Retreat was
consistently accompanied by a decrease in sgACC activity and
an increase in SCR. Thus, for both transitions, inverted patterns
of change in sgACC activity and in SCR level were observed at
the individual participant level (Sign test: Z = 3.33, p < 0.005).
Due to the well established role of the amygdala in mediating
fear-related physiological arousal (LeDoux, 1996), we conducted
a similar analysis for the amygdala ROIs. This revealed that
opposite to the pattern observed in the sgACC, the transition
between LFA and HFA was consistently accompanied by
a drop in both amygdala activity and SCR, whereas the transition
between HFA and Retreat was consistently accompanied by
a rise in both amygdala activity and SCR (Figures 6C and 6D).
Thus, for both transitions, similar change patterns in amygdala
activity and in SCR level were observed at the individual partic-
ipant level (left amygdala: Sign test: Z = 0.7, p > 0.05; right amyg-
dala: Sign test: Z = 1.15, p > 0.05). As implied by the above,Neuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 955
Figure 5. The sgACC Is the Only Region Displaying Activity Posi-
tively Correlated with Fear Levels Exclusively in Advance Choices
(A and B) Beta values representing BOLD activity levels in Low- and High-Fear
Advance and Retreat choices of the FR, in ROIs displaying significant posi-
tively (A) or negatively (B) PFA-correlated activity. ROIs from top to bottom
are as follows: (A) sgACC, left lingual gyrus (LLG), right inferior parietal lobule
(R IPL), right (R) precuneus, right supplementary motor area (R SMA), right
middle frontal gyrus (R MFG), and left cerebellar tonsil (L cereb); (B) left amyg-
dala (L Amy), right amygdala (R Amy), right inferior temporal gyrus (R ITG), right
parahippocampal gyrus (R PHG), right superior temporal sulcus (R STS), and
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956 Neuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.plotting the changes in sgACC versus those in the amygdala
demonstrated a pattern of inverse concomitant changes in
activity within these regions in the transition between choices
pertaining to the different behavioral bins (left amygdala: Sign
test: Z = 3.02, p < 0.005; right amygdala: Sign test: Z = 2.85,
p < 0.005, Figure S3).
DISCUSSION
In this studyweexamined thebehavioral, physiological, andbrain
correlates of overcoming fear or succumbing to it in an acute
fearful ambience. Specifically, we confronted snake-fearing indi-
vidualswith decisionswhether tomove a live snake away or bring
it closer to their heads. Each instance of overriding the fear and
engaging in an action that is opposed to that promoted by this
fear is defined by us, following others (Rachman, 2004a), as an
instance of courage. Some might add that courage could also
be considered in terms of perseverance (Rachman, 1984). In
this respect, our experimental protocol taps into multiple mani-
festations of perseverance, ranging from that required to over-
come the fear on each decision point to that required to keep
making fear-overriding decisions over time. At the behavioral
and physiological level, our results demonstrate that overcoming
fear was associated with a dissociation between subjective fear
(assessed by fear self-ratings) and somatic arousal (assessed
by SCR). Hence either high somatic arousal accompanied by
low subjective fear or high subjective fear accompanied by low
somatic arousal were accompanied by decisions to bring the
snake closer. In contrast, congruence of the two measures, i.e.,
high subjective fear accompanied by high somatic arousal, was
associated with moving the snake farther away.
At the whole-brain level, our data demonstrate that activity in
only a small set of areas, the sgACC and the rTP, was positively
correlated with choosing to overcome fear. Furthermore, activity
in the sgACCcorrelated positively with the level of subjective fear
when choosing to overcome fear but not when choosing to
succumb to it. In contrast, activity in a set of temporal lobe struc-
tures, including bilateral amygdala, bilateral STS, rPHG, and
rITG, was attenuated as the level of subjective fear increased
when choosing to overcome fear. This pattern was inverted
when participants failed to overcome fear (Retreat choices).
In these instances, the aforementioned regions exhibited a rela-
tive increase in activity as compared with that observed after
HFA choices, whereas the sgACC displayed a sharp decrease
in activity. Hence, our results point to the sgACC as the only brain
region detected in which the pattern of activity matched that
which may be expected of a region involved in a successful
mental effort to overcome fear. Specifically, this region exhibited
greater activity in instances where the overcoming of fear was
displayed, as compared with activity in instances of succumbing
to fear. Furthermore, within such successful instances of over-
coming fear, those involving greater subjective fear and
concomitantly necessitating a larger mental effort to overcome
that fear also involved greater activity in this region.left superior temporal sulcus (L STS). The inset in the sgACC panel (A, top
panel) depicts the beta values for Low- and High-Fear Advance choices in
the sgACC of the FNR; see text. See also Figure S2.
Figure 6. Somatic Arousal Associated with
Choices Taken by the Fearful-Retreaters
and Its Relation to Activity of the sgACC
and Amygdala
(A) SCR levels in Low-Fear-Advance (LFA), High-
Fear Advance (HFA), and Retreat choices of the
FR group in the Snake condition.
(B–D) Changes in BOLD activity (beta values) and
in SCR in the transition between choices pertain-
ing to the different choice bins, plotted against
each other ([HFA b – LFA b] versus [HFA SCR –
LFA SCR] and [Retreat b – HFA b] versus [Retreat
SCR –HFA SCR]) for the sgACC (B) and amygdala
(C and D), for each participant. *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.005.
See also Figure S3.
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Brain Mechanisms of CourageThe ACC has been implicated in regulation of both cognitive
and emotional processing (Bush et al., 2000). Specifically, the
ventral region of the ACC encompassing the sgACC is consid-
ered to be activated by tasks that relate to affective or
emotional content (Bush et al., 2000; Allman et al., 2001).
Highly relevant to the study of courage, studies of cognitive
control of emotion (Ochsner and Gross, 2005) have demon-
strated a role of the sgACC in regulation of affect associated
with negative autobiographical memories (Kross et al., 2009),
in regulation of conditioned-fear-related SCR (Delgado et al.,
2008), and in a deficit in effortful downregulation of emotion
in response to phobic stimuli in spider phobics (Hermann
et al., 2009). Additionally, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), encompassing the sgACC, has been reported to be
hypoactive in posttraumatic stress disorder (Etkin and Wager,
2007).
A role for the sgACC in overcoming fear is also in line with
studies of experimental extinction of fear conditioning, which
report a role for vmPFC in retrieval of the inhibitory association
(Morgan et al., 1993; Milad and Quirk, 2002; Phelps et al.,
2004; Milad et al., 2005, 2007a; Kalisch et al., 2006). However,
in our protocol, fear increases over time, whereas in extinction,
the fear—which stems from a past conditioned association—
decreases. Furthermore, whereas in most extinction studies,
the vmPFC was implicated only after a consolidation period
and not during conditioned fear acquisition or extinction training
(Milad and Quirk, 2002; Phelps et al., 2004; Santini et al., 2004;
but see Milad et al., 2007a), in our study the sgACC displayed
on-line fluctuations in activity, correlated with choosing to over-
come or succumb to ongoing fear. Nevertheless, our findings
suggest that instances of courageous action in a naturalistic
fearful situation that demands immediate response may require
swift recruitment of some brain substrates that also subserveNeuron 66, 949–9incremental, training-dependent inhibi-
tion of the expression of fear in experi-
mental extinction.
How then might activity in the sgACC
contribute to overcoming the fear of the
snake in our paradigm? Our data demon-
strate that changes in somatic arousal
were opposite to those in sgACC activity.That is, somatic arousal was attenuated as the level of subjective
(i.e., self-reported) fear increased when choosing to overcome
fear, but intensified in the transition between high subjective-
fear-related instances of overcoming fear (HFA choices) and
high subjective-fear-related instances of succumbing to fear
(Retreat choices). This suggests a mechanism by which activity
in the sgACC may serve to inhibit fear-related somatic arousal,
which contributes to the promotion of Advance choices.
In line with this proposal, the sgACC was implicated in regula-
tion of the autonomic nervous system by increasing parasympa-
thetic tone (Matthews et al., 2004; Tang et al., 2009). Further-
more, the sgACC is densely interconnected with subcortical
structures that control autonomic and visceral responses, such
as the hypothalamus, orbitofrontal cortex, and notably, the
amygdala (Johansen-Berg et al., 2008; Rudebeck et al., 2008).
The sgACC may thus reduce such responses by exerting an
inhibitory influence on these structures. Indeed, it has been
proposed that the role of mPFC in expression of experimental
extinction might involve inhibition of the amygdala (Quirk et al.,
2003; Rosenkranz et al., 2003). This inhibition has later been
specifically attributed to the infralimbic region, within the ventral
part of mPFC (i.e., vmPFC) (Vidal-Gonzalez et al., 2006). A similar
mechanism was suggested to underlie a reduction in condi-
tioned-fear-related SCR following the use of a reappraisal cogni-
tive control strategy (Delgado et al., 2008). Likewise, functional
decoupling between cognitive-control-related prefrontal regions
and amygdala has been suggested to underlie symptom provo-
cation in a specific phobia (Ahs et al., 2009). Activity in the amyg-
dala in our paradigm displayed a pattern opposite to that
observed in the sgACC, and similar to that observed for SCR,
i.e., attenuation with increasing levels of subjective fear in
Advance. This finding may seem counterintuitive at first, given
the well established role of amygdala in the expression of fear62, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 957
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et al., 2008). The possibility that this attenuation merely reflected
time-dependent habituation seems unlikely, because amygdala
activity was higher in Retreat than in HFA (Figure 5), whereas
the chronology of these two types of choices within the experi-
mental timeline did not differ (Figure S2). Hence, in line with the
above, a plausible account might also involve increased inhibi-
tion of the amygdala as a consequence of greater mental effort
invested in overcoming fear (Advance choices), reflected in
greater sgACC activity, when fear levels were higher. All in all
we propose that dampening of fear-related somatic arousal by
sgACC, through either or both of the aforementioned direct
and indirect pathways, may in turn promote overcoming ongoing
fear. In this regard it is noteworthy that fear extinction studies in
humans have commonly used a change in SCR as a measure of
extinction success, whereas our data support the notion that re-
ported fear feeling, fear-related somatic arousal, and fear driven
action may under certain circumstances exhibit dissociation
(Leitenberg et al., 1971; Lang et al., 1983; Rachman, 2004a).
The only other region apart from the sgACC that displayed
Advance >Retreat activity was the rTP. The TP is interconnected
with all sensory systems represented in the temporal lobe (visual,
auditory, and olfactory) and has accordingly been implicated in
high-level perception (Olson et al., 2007). It is also reciprocally
connected to the amygdala and the basal forebrain (including
orbitofrontal and medial networks) and projects to the hypothal-
amus and periaqueductal gray (PAG), implicating it in both
emotional processing and visceral modulation (Kondo et al.,
2003). Concurrent with a role in emotion processing, activations
in the TP concomitant with emotions evoked by visual stimuli
have been reported (Olson et al., 2007). In accord with a role in
visceral modulation, stimulation of the TP has been shown to
produce changes in respiratory rate and blood pressure (Kaada
et al., 1949). In line with the above, it has been suggested that
together with medial prefrontal networks, TP is part of a system
that modulates visceral emotional functions in response to
emotionally evocative perceptual stimuli (Kondo et al., 2003;
Olson et al., 2007). This may account for the analogous patterns
of activity observed in the sgACC and rTP in instances of
Advance and Retreat in our paradigm. It has further been sug-
gested that the TP may be reactivated when emotions are
perceived or imagined (Olson et al., 2007). Such a function, as
well as potential postaction evaluation and monitoring, may be
related to the rise in activity observed in our paradigm in this
region following the choice button press in all groups in both
experimental conditions (Snake and Toy Bear). That is, following
each choice subjects had to report the level of fear they experi-
enced in the period leading up to the choice. Hence, it is possible
that the rise in activity in this area following the choice reflected
this process of self-evaluation of fear.
A small number of other temporal lobe regions, namely, rPHG,
STS, and rITG, exhibited activity patterns similar to those
observed in the amygdala. All these regions interconnect with
the amygdala (Aggleton et al., 1980). Parahippocampal cortex
was reported to provide a source of highly processed cortical
information directly into the amygdala (Gallagher, 2000). STS
activity has been implicated in the processing of biological
motion. Additionally, the STS has been implicated in viewing958 Neuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.eye movements, and specifically in judgments of gaze direction
and opening and closing movements of the mouth. ITG has
also been implicated as part of an occipito-temporal network
involved in gaze perception (Wicker et al., 1998). It is noteworthy
that the aforesaid functions attributed to these temporal lobe
regions were observed mainly in the context of human interac-
tions with conspecifics. Nevertheless, such functions may also
play a role in assessing the threat imposed by a nearby snake.
Indeed, the involvement of STS in the processing of biological
motion has been suggested to play a role in deciphering intention
in predators (Puce and Perrett, 2003). Taken together, it is plau-
sible that activity in these regions was related to subjects’
assessments of the snake’s behavior in terms of movement
and assumed intention when deciding whether to choose
Advance or Retreat.
Both dorsal ACC and anterior insula, two regions implicated in
processing fear, exhibited greater activity in Retreat than in
Advance. In humans, the dorsal ACC has been shown to play
a role in conditioned fear acquisition and expression as assessed
by SCR (Milad et al., 2007b), possibly through generation of
autonomic responses (Critchley, 2005). Furthermore, electrical
stimulation of this region led to reports of intense feelings of
fear, whereas its ablation reduces anxiety symptoms (Meyer
et al., 1973). Concomitant with the above, a role for the proposed
rat homolog of the dorsal ACC, the prelimbic cortex (PL), in
expression of conditioned fear and failure of extinction has
been reported (Quirk et al., 2006; Burgos-Robles et al., 2009).
The anterior insula has been suggested to encode autonomic
and visceral responses and support their interaction with per-
ceived threat signals, leading to conscious subjective emotional
experiences such as feelings of fear (Critchley, 2005). The ante-
rior insula has also been implicated in the perception of disgust
(Jabbi et al., 2008), an emotion that could be evoked in the prox-
imity of snakes and augment fear, though ranked by the FR as
much weaker than fear per se (data not shown). In line with the
present findings, both the dorsal ACC and insula have been
reported to display reduction of hyperactivity in spider phobics
after cognitive behavioral therapy (Straube et al., 2006; Goos-
sens et al., 2007).
No activity differentiating Advance and Retreat choices was
observed by us in prefrontal areas that are traditionally impli-
cated in cognitive control of emotion, such as ventrolateral,
dorsolateral, or dorsomedial PFC (Ochsner and Gross, 2005).
One account for this null finding may be that, as opposed to
studies of cognitive control of emotion that instruct participants
regarding specific cognitive strategies to be used, in our study
individuals used idiosyncratic strategies when deciding whether
to overcome or succumb to fear. To the extent that different
strategies may recruit different prefrontal regions (Ochsner and
Gross, 2005), no particular region might be expected to come
up in our group analysis. If correct, such an account points to
the sgACC as a common mediator of different cognitive control
strategies in instances of overcoming fear. A second alternative
may be that decisions to both overcome and succumb to fear
involve similar activity levels within one of the abovementioned
PFC regions, and only differentiate in the details of the process-
ing carried out in this region, which could not be differentiated
by BOLD signals. A third explanation may be that the sgACC
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paradigm, a rather unlikely scenario given previous evidence
regarding the function of this region (see above).
Based on the above, we propose a heuristic model wherein in
the context of a fear-eliciting situation, goal-directed motivation
to overcome fear leads to activation of the sgACC to reduce auto-
nomic arousal and enable a display of courage. We suggest that
because our paradigm allowed for anticipation of the upcoming
choice (Rachman, 2004b), this activation was initiated already
prior to the choice (in both Advance and Retreat, Figure 3B) so
as to permit efficient dampening of somatic arousal upon the
expected exposure of the snake. Following exposure to the
fear-eliciting stimulus, sensory information relevant to both
implicit and explicit assessments of the threat imposed by the
stimulus (e.g., proximity, mobility, posture, gaze direction, etc.
in the case of the snake) is conveyed to multiple brain systems.
These include circuits that perform computations relevant to
the specific object of fear (e.g., appraisal of menacing motion
and intentionality, possibly by STS and rITG in the present para-
digm) and circuits that are item invariant. In view of their previous
implication in other types of emotion paradigms, amygdala,
dorsal ACC, and insula are candidates for such a ‘‘global’’ role.
To the extent that, following processing in these circuits, certain
thresholds of both subjectively experienced, reportable fear
and autonomic arousal (or a threshold derived from summation
of the two) are surpassed, the mental effort invested in over-
coming fear is aborted. This leads to a concomitant drop in
sgACC activity and a further rise in autonomic arousal, culmi-
nating in succumbing to fear. If, however, either of these thresh-
olds (or a combined one; see above) is not reached, the effort in-
vested in overcoming fear and concomitant sgACC activity is
sustained (and is proportional to the level of subjectively experi-
enced, reported fear). This leads to dampening of autonomic
arousal, i.e., aprocessof fear inhibition,whichpromotesadisplay
of courage. Hence courage involves fear inhibition, yet is not
identical to it, since fear inhibition may not necessarily result in
voluntary action opposing that promoted by fear, whereas cour-
age does. It is noteworthy that the equivalent subjective fear
reported forHFA andRetreat choices indicates that under certain
circumstances exceeding the above suggested autonomic
arousal threshold might not be explicitly detected, i.e., may
remain dissociated from the subjective, reported experience.
Our results thus propose an account for brain processes and
mechanisms supporting an intriguing aspect of human behavior,
i.e., the ability to carry out a voluntary action, namely courage,
opposed to an action promoted by ongoing fear. Specifically,
our results delineate the importance of maintaining high sgACC
activity in successful efforts to overcome ongoing fear. They
hence point to the possibility of manipulating sgACC activity in
therapeutic intervention in disorders involving a failure to over-
come fear. Such interventions may range from training in medi-
tation techniques that lead to greater activity in this region
(Tang et al., 2009) to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
similar to that attempted to alleviate depression (Paus and
Barrett, 2004). On top of its potential applied importance, further
analyses of brain circuits that subserve instantaneous over-
coming of fear could also contribute to better understanding of
how the brain shifts swiftly between internal representations(Eisenberg et al., 2003; Mobbs et al., 2007) to select one of
several conflicting behavioral outcomes in other contexts.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Selection of potential high-fear participants was carried out using the SNAQ
(score range: 0 – no fear, 30 – highly fearful; Klorman et al., 1974), translated
in-house into Hebrew. Individuals scoring 11 or higher on the SNAQ, corre-
sponding to the upper 20% in our screen, were considered candidate high-
fear participants. The selection of potential low-fear participants was based
in the first stage of the selection on self reports of extensive prior experience
with snakes in the context of occupation or hobby. All candidates meeting
the above criteria were then contacted by phone, given a detailed description
of the outline of the experiment and asked whether they would be willing to
participate. Those who agreed were summoned to a preliminary session in
which they completed a STAI-T (Spielberger, 1983). Participants of the low-
fear group also completed the SNAQ at this time. All participants were addi-
tionally interviewed by a certifiedMD to identify potential susceptibility to panic
attacks. After that stage, all the participants signed a consent form. The afore-
mentioned procedure resulted in two pools of participants, a high-fear pool
(n = 39) and a low-fear pool (n = 22). All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Ultimately, the FR, FNR, and FL (see main text) were selected from
these pools (see Inclusion Criteria in Supplemental Information). The experi-
mental protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Geha
Mental Health Center, Petah Tikva. The use of the snake was approved by
the Institutional Animal Care Committee of the Weizmann Institute of Science.
Analysis of Choice-Related SCR
Skin conductance level (SCL) was recorded continuously throughout the
experiment from theparticipant’s first phalangesof the secondand third fingers
in the left hand using a BIOPAC systems skin conductance module (Biopac
Systems, Inc, Coleta, CA), shielded Ag-AgCl electrodes grounded through an
RF filter panel, and AcqKnowledge software (Biopac Systems, Inc, Coleta,
CA). A choice-related SCR was defined as the base-to-peak difference for
the largest deflection in SCL (larger than 0.1 mS) commencing in the time
window between object exposure and choice button press (i.e., the same
time window defined as the choice event and for which fear ratings were
collected), analyzed using in-house MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA)
software. Choice-related SCRs were averaged per participant per condition.
Statistical Analysis of the Behavioral and SCR Measures
Fear ratings determined on the Visual Analog Scale (VAS) were calculated
separately for each condition type (Snake and Toy Bear) in each of the groups
(FF and FL) by calculating the average fear ratings collapsed over all choices
for each participant. The average fear ratings were analyzed with a mixed
model ANOVA with condition (Snake, Toy Bear) as the within-subject factor
and group (FF, FL) as the between-subject factor. STAI-S scores and deci-
sion-related SCRs (see above) were analyzed in the same manner. For the
STAI-S scores each subject’s single score was used in the ANOVA. For all
measures a Tukey HSD test was used for specific posthoc comparisons.
Comparisons between STAI-T scores and SNAQ scores of the FF and FL
were conducted using a Student’s t test. The two groups significantly differed
in fear of snakes (FF = 15.69 ± 1.02; FL = 2.38 ± 0.34; t30 = 12.39, p < 10
6).
A comparison between fear ratings of the FR and FNR was conducted using
a Student’s t test. Comparisons within the FF group between Advance and
Retreat for fear rating, SCRs, number of choices, and choice response times
were conducted using dependent t tests. Comparisons within the FF group
between LFA, HFA, and Retreat choices for fear ratings, SCRs, proximity
to the snake and chronology in the experiment were conducted using
repeated-measures ANOVA for each of these measures separately. In all anal-
yses pertaining to the FR involving the three choice bins (including those of
fMRI data; see below), data of one participant that had only three choices in
the LFA bin was excluded from the analysis. A comparison between choice
response times of Advance choices in the Toy Bear condition of the three
groups (FR, FNR, and FL) was conducted using a one-way ANOVA.Neuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 959
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Imaging was performed on a 3T Trio Magnetom Siemens scanner at the
Norman and Helen Asher Center for Brain Imaging, Weizmann Institute of
Science. All images were acquired using a 12 channel head matrix coil.
Three-dimensional T1-weighted anatomical scans were acquired with high
resolution 1 mm slice thickness (3D MP-RAGE sequence, TR 2300 ms, TE
2.98 ms, 1 mm3 voxels). For BOLD scanning, T2*-weighted images were
acquired using the following parameters: TR = 2000 ms, TE = 27 ms, Flip
angle = 75, 38 oblique slices without gap, 30 toward coronal plane from
ACPC, 3 3 3 3 4 mm voxel size, covering the whole brain.
fMRI Analysis
Preprocessing
Preprocessing and data analyses of the fMRI data were performed using
BrainVoyager QX version 1.10 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, Netherlands).
Images were corrected for slice-timing, head movements (three scans with
head movements larger than 3 mm [translation] or 3 [rotation] were rejected),
and linear drifts. Low frequencies were filtered out from the data. Images were
spatially smoothed using a 6 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM)
Gaussian kernel. The first four volumes (8 s) from the beginning of each scan
were removed from the data set to account for signal equilibrium. Functional
and anatomical scans were spatially normalized by extrapolation into a 3D
volume in Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988). Functional scans
were resliced into an iso-voxel resolution of 3 mm3.
Statistical Analysis
All contrasts of interest were performed at the group level using a random-
effects analysis. To correct for multiple comparisons in the whole-brain statis-
tical maps (Figures 3, 4, and S1), we implemented a randomization technique
to estimate a corrected cluster-level confidence for the entire volume
(at a = 0.05) based on a method described by Forman et al. (1995) and Goebel
et al. (2006) using the Brain Voyager Cluster-level Statistical Threshold Esti-
mator Plugin. The method uses a nonparametric Monte Carlo simulation that
calculates the likelihood of obtaining a cluster of randomly generated voxels
across the entire volume at the given individual voxel probability threshold.
The correction takes into account the resolution of the sampling and the spatial
smoothness applied to the data. Preprocessed time series data for scans of
interest were analyzed using GLMs specified to investigate the conditions of
interest.
GLMs Used
GLM1 included separate predictors for Advance, Retreat, and fear ratings.
Black screen periods were considered as baseline (see Figure 1B). An addi-
tional predictor was used to model the few ‘‘No choice’’ events (i.e., choice
events in which no choice button presswas preformed) that occurred in a small
number of subjects. This GLM was used for comparing Advance and Retreat
choices in the FR (Figure 3).
GLM2 included the same predictors as GLM1, albeit with an additional
predictor, PFA, used to detect voxels in which BOLD activity was correlated
with the level of subjective fear (assessed by VAS scores) experienced in
Advance. To create the above predictor, each FR group participant’s Advance
choices were first binned into three groups (Low-, Medium-, and High-Fear)
according to their corresponding fear levels using a K-means algorithm imple-
mented in MATLAB. The predictor was assigned a negative weight (1) for
Advance choices within the Low-Fear cluster, zero weight for those within
the Medium-Fear cluster, and a positive weight (1) for those within the High-
Fear cluster. As mentioned above, this predictor was used to identify within
the FR group ROIs in which BOLD activity correlated with the level of fear in
Advance (Figure 4).
GLM3 included the same predictors as GLM1, albeit with the Advance
predictor replaced by two separate predictors. The first, HFA, modeled (per
FR participant) the Advance choices with the highest fear levels that were
equal in number to Retreat choices of that participant. The second, LFA,
modeled the remaining Advance choices. This GLM was used to control for
the difference in average number of Retreat and Advance choices (Figure S1),
and to extract separate BOLD activity measures for the HFA, LFA, and Retreat
choice bins of the FR participants in the ROIs identified using GLM2 (Figures 5,
6, and S3). For calculation of these activity measures (beta values) in the
different choice bins, the average beta for the 125 contiguous anatomical960 Neuron 66, 949–962, June 24, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc.voxels (125 mm3) displaying the peak activity in each of the group level ROIs
derived from the PFA versus Baseline contrast (see GLM2 above, Figure 4,
and Table S2) was first calculated separately per participant per bin. All partic-
ipants’ average betas were further averaged to create the group average for
each bin. For the sgACC, the peak 125 contiguous anatomical voxels derived
from the conjunction of the original [Advance > Retreat] and [PFA versusBase-
line] contrasts (see Figure 4) were used. In all analyses pertaining to the FR
involving the three choice bins, data of one participant that had only three
choices in the LFA bin was excluded from the analysis. Similar GLMs were
used to extract separate BOLD activity measures for HFA and LFA choices
in the Snake condition of the FNR (the FNR’s Advance choices were separated
into these two bins according to their corresponding fear levels using
a K-means algorithm implemented in MATLAB) (inset in Figure 5A, top panel),
for Early and Late Advance choices in the Snake condition of the FL, and in the
Toy Bear condition of all groups (Figure S2). In these analyses, data of subjects
for whom differential activity between the two choice bins was larger than two
standard deviations from the group mean differential activity was excluded
from the analysis. This resulted in exclusion of data of one participant in
each of these analyses.
GLM4 included the same predictors as GLM1, albeit with the Advance and
Retreat predictors modeling the whole time window between beginning of the
prechoice black screen and the choice button press (see Figure 1B). Conse-
quently, in this GLM only the prerating black screen was considered as base-
line. GLM4was used to search for areas, in addition to the sgACC and rTP, that
might have displayed choice related BOLD activity already prior to the choice
in FR group participants (Figure S1).
Calculation of Percent of BOLD Signal Change
For calculation of average percent of BOLD signal change (PSC) (Figures 3 and
S1), zero PSC was defined as the average BOLD signal in the two TRs prior to
the onset of the choice event of interest (predefined as beginning of exposure
of the object; see Figure 1B). Average PSC was first calculated separately for
each participant for the group level ROIs derived from the Advance versus
Retreat contrast in the FR. This was done by averaging the BOLD signal of
all voxels in the original group ROI for each participant for each TR in the 5
to 12 TR window around time 0 (see above). A group average for each TR in
each ROI for all choice events of interest was then calculated.
Statistical Analysis of Concomitant Changes in SCR and BOLD
Activity in the sgACC andAmygdala ROIs, in the Transitions between
Different Choice Bins of the FR
The difference in the value of each of these measures (SCR, sgACC beta,
amygdala beta) between the different choices bins ([HFA – LFA], or Transition
A, and [Retreat – HFA], or Transition B) were calculated for the FR. A positive
difference was assigned a value of 1. A negative or nonexistent difference was
assigned a value of 0. A combined score representing both differences per
measure (Transition B  Transition A) per participant was then calculated.
A Sign test was conducted on these combined scores for all comparisons of
interest (sgACC beta versus SCR [Figure 6], amygdala beta versus SCR
[Figure 6], and sgACC beta versus amygdala beta [Figure S3]). Thus, a signifi-
cant p value indicates that changes in the two compared measures in the tran-
sitions between the different choices bins were opposite in direction (i.e., a rise
in one measure was accompanied by a drop in the other and vice versa).
Conversely, a nonsignificant p value indicates that changes in the two
compared measures in the transitions between the different choices bins
were similar in direction.SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information for this article includes three figures and Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.06.009.
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